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Abstract
This paper analyzes how endogenous imperfect exchange rate pass-through
a⁄ects in￿ ation targeting optimal monetary policies in a New Keynesian small
open economy. The paper shows that an inverse relation exists between the pass-
through and the insulation of the economy from foreign and monetary policy
shocks, and that imperfect pass-through tends to decrease the variability of the
terms of trade. Furthermore, with CPI in￿ation targeting, in the short run,
delayed pass-through constrains monetary policy more than incomplete pass-
through and interest rate smoothing ampli￿es this e⁄ect. When the pass-through
decreases, the variability in economic activity tends to raise and the trade-o⁄
between the stabilization of CPI in￿ ation and output worsens in direct relation
to how strictly the central bank is targeting CPI in￿ ation. In contrast, with
domestic in￿ation targeting, optimal monetary policy is not constrained and
opposite results occur. Consequently, imperfect pass-through favors the choice
of domestic to CPI in￿ ation targeting.
JEL Classi￿cation: E52, E58, F41.
Key Words: In￿ ation Targeting; Exchange Rate Pass-through; Small open-
economy; Direct Exchange Rate Channel; Optimal Monetary Policy.
1 Introduction
What is the appropriate monetary policy response to domestic and foreign shocks
with imperfect exchange rate pass-through? How does incomplete or delayed pass-
through a⁄ect the e¢ ciency of the monetary policy and the volatility of the economy?
What measure of in￿ ation should a central bank target considering di⁄erent types of
pass-through? In the last few years this type of questions has prompted an increase
of interest in the relationship between the pass-through of the exchange rate and
￿This paper has been partly prepared during my visit at Princeton University, January-May 2003
and partly during my stay at the Graduate Institute of International Studies of Geneva. I thank
Charles Wyplosz and Lars Svensson for valuable discussions, hindsight and encouragement and an
anonymous referee for useful and detailed comments. I thank Hans Genberg, Alexander Swoboda and
Michael Woodford for useful discussions and suggestions. I have also bene￿ted from comments from
Gianluca Benigno, Andrea Fracasso and Roman Marimon and the participants to seminars at the
Graduate Institute of International Studies, the London School of Economics, the Ente Einaudi, and
the XIII international ￿ Tor Vergata￿conference on Banking and Finance. Any errors are my own.
Financial support from Ente ￿ Luigi Einaudi￿and Princeton University is gratefully acknowledged.
yE-mail: ￿ amini8@hei.unige.ch
1the working of the economy1. This interest is supported by several empirical works
spanning over two decades and di⁄ering for the countries and the industries considered
which provide evidence on imperfect pass-through2.
The pass-through of costs to import price is a complex mechanism, and several
factors may play a role in its determination. The positive correlation between in￿ a-
tion and in￿ ation persistence, and the positive impact of the expectations of in￿ ation
persistence on the pass-through (via the Taylor staggered price-setting behavior), es-
tablish a positive relation from in￿ ation to the degree of pass-through (Taylor, 2000).
Also, the ￿rm￿ s strategy of the pricing to market (PTM) based on international mar-
ket segmentation and local currency pricing (LCP) leads to incomplete pass-through
(Betts and Devereux, 2000).3 Furthermore, the presence of shipping costs and non-
traded distribution services as well as intermediary ￿rms between the exporters and
the consumers is likely to reduce the pass-through more (Mc Callum and Nelson
(1999), Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2000)).
Taking these factors into account, it has been possible to obtain interesting results
on the relation between the pass-through and the optimal monetary policy4.
In a New Keynesian perspective, considering an emerging market economy with
nominal rigidities in both the non-traded goods and import sectors, Devereux, Lane
and Xu (2004) show that in the case of complete pass-through, non-tradable in￿ ation-
targeting dominates CPI in￿ ation-targeting and an exchange rate peg while, in the
case of delayed pass-through, CPI in￿ ation-targeting performs better. Devereux
(2001) considers a small open-economy with sticky prices in the non-traded goods
and import sectors and compares the Taylor rule, a rule that stabilizes non-traded
goods in￿ ation, strict CPI in￿ ation-targeting and a rule which pegs the exchange
rate. He ￿nds that in general, with delayed pass-through, the trade-o⁄ between
output and in￿ ation variability is less pronounced; the best monetary policy sta-
bilizes non-traded goods price in￿ ation; and strict CPI in￿ ation-targeting performs
better with partial pass-through. Smets and Wouters (2002) present a small open-
economy model calibrated to euro area data with nominal rigidities in the domestic
and imported goods sectors. In this framework, they consider that the welfare costs
determined by nominal rigidities in the imported goods sector depend positively on
the exchange rate variability. Consequently, they make the point that with delayed
pass-through, output-gap stabilization is constrained by the minimization of these
1The expression ￿ exchange rate pass-through￿ denotes the transmission of a change in import
costs to the domestic prices of imported goods.
2For example, Krugman (1987) considering US import data in the period 1980-1983 ￿nds that,
in the machinery and transport sector, 35 to 40 percent of the appreciation of the dollar was not
re￿ ected in a decrease of the import prices. Knetter (1989) ￿nds that for the period 1977-1985 US
export prices in the destination market currency tend to be either insensitive to exchange rate ￿ uc-
tuations or tend to amplify their impact, while German export prices tend to stabilize the exchange
rate ￿ uctuations. Considering the sample period 1974-1987, Knetter (1993) shows that Japanese
export price adjustments in the destination country currency o⁄set 48 percent of the exchange rate
￿ uctuations while for U.K. and German export prices this fraction reaches 36 percent. More recently,
Campa and Goldberg￿ s (2002) estimation for the period 1975-1999 and a sample of OECD countries
supported the complete pass-through hypothesis for the long run but not for the short run.
3LCP, in turn, has been justi￿ed in two ways: by a low market share of the exporter country in
the foreign market coupled with a low degree of di⁄erentiation of its goods (Bacchetta and Wincoop,
2002) and by a greater monetary policy stability of the importing country compared to that of the
exporting country (Devereux and Engel, 2001 and Devereux et al., 2004).
4See also Lane and Ganelli (2002) for a survey of the implications of di⁄erent degrees of pass-
through when the currency denomination of assets contracts is taken into account.
2welfare costs because it leads to larger exchange rate variability.
In a New Classical perspective, Corsetti and Pesenti (2004) show the importance
of the degree of pass-through in a⁄ecting the trade-o⁄ between output-gap stabiliza-
tion and import costs, and the implication for the optimal monetary policy. When the
pass-through is incomplete because of LCP, exporters￿pro￿ts oscillate with the ex-
change rate, and the hedging behavior of the exporters consequently links the import
prices positively to the variability of the exchange rate. Then, if the monetary policy
aims to stabilize the output-gap, it will increase the variability of the exchange rate
and the import prices. Hence, optimal monetary policy has to equate at the margin
the cost of the output-gap with the cost of a higher import price. It follows that the
lower the pass-through, the lower the socially optimal output-gap stabilization5.
These models employ a welfare optimization approach to determine the monetary
policy while considering either delayed or incomplete pass-through. The present study
di⁄ers from the previous models because embeds into the New Keynesian framework
(i) in￿ation-forecast targeting, which is the procedure followed by in￿ ation-targeting
central banks6; (ii) a more sophisticated transmission mechanism with stylized real-
istic lags for various channels; and (iii) both incomplete and delayed pass-through.
All these features are critical to analyze real world monetary policy. As noted by
Svensson (2003, 2005), a maximizing welfare approach is not operational, in contrast
to in￿ ation-targeting. Also, a realistic transmission mechanism is important because
it allows addressing a main di¢ culty of monetary policy: the large gap between goals
and instrument. Finally, considering only one type of imperfect pass-through could
be misleading in the understanding of the transmission mechanism and the actual
latitude of the monetary policy.
The motivating idea of this work is that the type and degree of pass-through a⁄ects
the projections of the economy, whose accurate determination is crucial for central
banks that pursue in￿ ation-targeting. The reasoning is the following. Optimal mone-
tary policy employs all its transmission channels according to their relative e¢ ciency.
These channels feature di⁄erent transmission lags, however, in open economies one
particular channel is considered to have no lag, whence comes the name of Direct
Exchange Rate Channel (henceforth DERC). Due to this quality, the DERC allows
monetary policy to a⁄ect current CPI in￿ ation and according to the conventional
view, and as it is shown in Ball (1998) and Svensson (2000), this channel plays a
prominent role in the transmission of monetary policy. Yet, the DERC is considered
in these papers with the strict assumption of perfect pass-through. Since imperfect
pass-through a⁄ects the e¢ ciency of the DERC and its interaction with the other
channels, it a⁄ects also the optimal use of all the transmission channels. Thus, the
type and degree of pass-through a⁄ects the dynamics of the economy and the pro-
jections of the macrovariables, which in turn are crucial with the in￿ ation-forecast
targeting procedure.
The main purpose of this study is to build a simple but reasonably general model
5On the relationship between welfare, exchange rate volatility and incomplete pass-through in a
similar perspective, see also Sutherland (2005).
6The procedure of in￿ ation-forecast targeting consists of ￿rst determining the projections for
in￿ ation (and output) conditional to all the information available and the monetary policy, and then
chosing the monetary policy that allows the projections to be equal to the targets at a certain time
horizon, or more realistically, that determines a desired path for the projections. See Svensson (1997)
and (1998b).
3to compare di⁄erent in￿ ation-targeting monetary policies and related responses of
the economy to shocks with endogenous incomplete and/or delayed pass-through.
The analysis is based on a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model built upon
Svensson￿ s (2000) model.
This model deviates from Svensson￿ s (2000) in two ways. 1. It provides com-
plete microfoundations, in particular concerning inertia in the aggregate supply and
demand relations following Christiano et al. (2001) and Abel (1990), respectively.
2. It includes two interacting sectors: a domestic sector that produces and retails
domestic goods and an import sector which only retails foreign goods. These sectors
are connected because the domestic one uses as intermediate goods its own goods
and the import goods while the import sector uses foreign and domestic goods.
The latter sector is similar to the import sector in Smets and Wouters (2002) in
that it derives delayed pass-through from the sticky price assumption modeled in the
style of Calvo (1983). It is also similar to McCallum and Nelson (1999), Burstein,
Neves and Rebelo (2003) and Corsetti and Dedola (2004), in that local inputs may be
required to bring the foreign goods to domestic consumers; as a result, when this is
the case, foreign goods are intermediate goods in the production of the import goods
and the pass-through turns out to be incomplete.
This is a notable feature of the model because it allows us to consider either foreign
goods as intermediate goods in the domestic sector but ￿nal goods in the import
sector or as intermediate goods in both the domestic and import sectors. An interest
in the latter case is motivated by the ￿nding of Kara and Nelson (2002), who show
that modelling imports as intermediate goods leads to an aggregate supply which
delivers the best approximation of the exchange rate/consumer price relationship.
Such ￿ exibility in the degree of delay and completeness of the pass-through allows
a better understanding of the relation between the various exchange rate channels
and the transmission mechanism of the monetary policy. Speci￿cally, it illustrates
how the pass-through a⁄ects the optimal use of all the transmission channels.
A key feature of this model is that it derives structural relations for all the agents
in the economy. In particular, the central bank follows a speci￿c targeting rule which,
as it has been shown by Svensson (2003), is equivalent to the equilibrium condi-
tion equating the marginal rate of substitution and transformation between the loss
function variables. The model determines this rule assuming that the central bank
minimizes in each period its intertemporal loss function under discretion, i.e. taking
the expectations of the private sector as given and knowing that it will reoptimize in
the subsequent periods. Thus the model looks for the Nash equilibrium in the game
between the central bank and the private sector, which turns out to be characterized
by a time-invariant reaction function for the central bank.
Within this framework the present study addresses some issues that have been
neglected in the literature. First, it analyzes the way in which the pass-through
a⁄ects the working of the DERC and examines to what extent this latter channel
is reliable for the transmission of the monetary impulse in the short run. Such an
analysis is important, as this channel is considered to be the only one available to
stabilize CPI in￿ ation in the short run.
Second, it considers that the DERC is also one of the avenues through which
shocks originating in the foreign sector propagate to CPI in￿ ation. Indeed, a shock
in foreign output or in￿ ation a⁄ects the foreign interest rate, which in turn propagates
to the exchange rate via the interest rate parity condition, ￿nally hitting CPI in￿ ation.
4Thus, the second question addressed is how the way in which the pass-through occurs
a⁄ects the degree of insulation of the economy from foreign shocks.
Third, the paper investigates the impact of imperfect pass-through on the volatil-
ity of the economy and on the choice of the in￿ ation target.
With regard to in￿ ation-targeting e⁄ectiveness, the analysis shows that the type
and degree of imperfect pass-through a⁄ect the capacity of the central bank to sta-
bilize in the short run CPI in￿ ation but not domestic in￿ ation. More speci￿cally,
delayed pass-through turns out to reduce monetary policy e⁄ectiveness more than in-
complete pass-through. Yet, similarly to domestic in￿ ation-targeting, in the medium
run, imperfect pass-through constrains less CPI in￿ ation-targeting.
In relation to the volatility of the economy, this study indicates that imperfect
pass-through decreases the variability of the terms of trade and, with CPI in￿ ation-
targeting, tends to increase the variability of the economy. Consequently, this study
suggests that it may be better to target domestic in￿ ation with incomplete and de-
layed pass-through.
The model also shows that, with CPI in￿ ation-targeting, imperfect pass-through
increases the trade-o⁄ between CPI in￿ ation and output-gap variabilities, and that
this phenomenon is stronger the more monetary policy is concerned with CPI in￿ ation
versus output-gap stabilization. Thus, it is important to know the type and degree
of the pass-through to assess the attainable trade-o⁄ between the variability of the
output-gap and CPI in￿ ation.
Finally, interest smoothing constrains the ability of the central bank to stabilize
CPI and domestic in￿ ation in the short run.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 analyzes the optimal monetary policy; in particular, the reaction functions
corresponding to di⁄erent types of in￿ ation-targeting and pass-through and the im-
pulse response functions to some domestic and foreign shocks. Section 4 focuses on
the relation between the pass-through, the volatility of the economy and the choice
of the in￿ ation measure to target. Section 5 concludes and suggests some directions
for further research. Appendix A and B present some details of the microfoundations
of the model and its state-space form.
2 The model
The model describes a small open economy related to an exogenous rest of the world.
All the equations for the domestic economy are structural relations derived from
equilibrium conditions that characterize optimal private and public sector behaviors.
In order to focus the analysis on the main features of the monetary transmission
mechanism, I follow Woodford (2003) in considering a ￿cashless￿economy7.
2.1 The household
The economy is populated by a continuum of unit mass of consumers/producers
indexed by j 2 [0;1] sharing the same preferences and living forever. Intertemporal
utility for the representative agent is given by
7Woodford (2003) shows that, in general, abstracting from monetary frictions has a minor impact









where ￿ is the intertemporal discount factor, Ct is total consumption of consumer
j; and ￿ Ct is the total aggregate consumption. Preferences over total consumption



























where e ￿ ￿ 0 captures the willingness to ￿keep up with the Joneses￿and ￿ > 0 is the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. This assumption is motivated by the results
of Fuhrer (2000) and Banerjee and Batini (2003) which show the importance of habit
formation in explaining the inertia in consumption decisions, consequently improving
the empirical ￿t of the sticky prices open economy model.
For sake of simplicity, labor is absent from the preferences of the consumer/producer
captured by (1)8. Yet, as it will be shown later, production implies disutility for the
consumer in the form of less consumption available. Indeed, consumption goods are
also intermediate goods used in production. Furthermore, since the input require-
ment function is convex9, more production implies a smaller share of goods available
for consumption. Thus, the utility function (1) can be interpreted as the utility of
the yeoman farmer which is increasing and concave in consumption and decreasing
and convex in production.
Total consumption, Ct; is a CES aggregate of two subindices for consumption of
the domestic good, Cd















where ￿ is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between domestic and import
goods and it is assumed equal to one following Corsetti and Pesenti (2004)10, w
determines the steady state share of imported goods in total consumption and Cd
t ,
Ci
t are Dixit-Stiglitz aggregates of continuum of di⁄erentiated domestic goods and










; h = d; i;
where # > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two di⁄erentiated goods
and, for sake of simplicity, is the same in both sectors.













8Another example of similar preferences is in Svensson (2000).
9The input requirement function is convex because the production function is assumed to be
concave. This assumption, in turn, can be motivated by constant capital.
10This assumption ensures the stationarity of the model.
6where B and B￿ are two international bonds issued on a discount basis and denomi-
nated in domestic and foreign currency with interest rates It and I￿
t respectively, St is
the nominal exchange rate, expressed as home currency per unit of foreign currency.
Dd
t and Di
t are the dividends distributed by the domestic and the import sector and,
￿nally,Pc is the overall Dixit-Stiglitz price index for the minimum cost of a unit of









with Pd; Pi denoting, respectively, the Dixit-Stiglitz price index for goods produced
in the domestic and import sector.
To rule out ￿Ponzi schemes￿ , I assume that in any period t the consumer chooses
the value of the portfolio in t+1 such that his borrowing is no larger than the present













and that the present value of future dividends is ￿nite.
Utility maximization subject to the budget constraint and the limit on borrowing
gives the Euler equation and the uncovered interest rate parity, respectively






e ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1 + e ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
< 1; (4)
it ￿ i￿
t = st+1jt ￿ st; (5)
where for any variable x; the expression xt+￿jt stands for the rational expectation of
that variable in period t+￿ conditional on the information available in period t and,







deviations from their respective constant steady state values; ￿nally, ct denotes total
aggregate consumption, obtained considering that in equilibrium total consumption
for agent j is equal to total aggregate consumption, i.e. Ct = ￿ Ct; and ￿c
t denotes CPI
in￿ ation (measured as the log deviation of gross CPI in￿ ation from the constant CPI
in￿ ation target).
2.1.1 Domestic consumption of goods produced in the domestic sector
Preferences captured by equation (2) imply that the (log deviation of the) domestic
demand for goods produced in the domestic sector, cd
t; is given by
cd







which, considering the (log-linearized version of the) price index equation (3), can be
rewritten as
cd
t = ct + w￿qt; (6)
where qt ￿ pi
t ￿ pd
t is the terms of trade.
Then, solving equation (4) for ct and combining it with equation (6) I obtain
cd
t = ￿￿ (1 ￿ F1L)
￿1 ￿t ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ F1L)
￿1 wqt + ￿wqt; (7)









can be interpreted as the long real interest rate1112:
2.1.2 Aggregate demand for goods produced in the domestic sector














t denote the quantity of the (composite) domestic good which
is used as an input in the domestic sector, as an input in the import sector and which
is demanded by the foreign sector, respectively.
To specify the quantities of the (composite) domestic good which are used as an
input in the domestic and import sector, it is convenient to describe here the pro-
duction technologies. I assume that both sectors share the same Leontief technology
and each one features a continuum of unit mass of ￿rms, indexed by j; that produce
di⁄erentiated goods Y d
t (j) and Y i
t (j) in the domestic and import sector respectively.
Furthermore, I assume that sectors di⁄er for the input used: the domestic sector uses
a composite input consisting of the domestic (composite) good itself and the (compos-
ite) import good produced in the import sector; the import sector uses a composite
input consisting of the foreign good Y ￿
t and the domestic (composite good). Thus
the production functions in the domestic and import sector are given respectively by
Y d































where f is an increasing, concave, isoelastic function, At is an exogenous (sector
speci￿c) economy-wide productivity parameter, ￿; ￿i 2 [0;1]; (1 ￿ ￿) and ￿denote,
respectively, the shares of domestic good and import good in the composite input




respectively, the shares of foreign good and domestic good in the composite input
required to produce the di⁄erentiated import good j:
Thus the quantities of the (composite) domestic good used as an input in the

























where b Y i
t denotes the demand of the import good. Finally, log-linearizing equation
(9) around the steady state values yields
11Under the expectations hypothesis and considering a zero-coupon bond with a ￿nite maturity,
the variable ￿t is approximately the product of the long real bond rate and its maturity; for further
discussion see Svensson (2000).



























> 0; (see the appendix for details):
Next, I assume, as in Svensson (2000), that c￿d







t + ￿￿w￿qt; (14)
where c￿
t denotes (log) foreign real consumption, ￿￿ and w￿ denote, respectively,
the foreign atemporal elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods
and the share of domestic goods in foreign consumption. Furthermore, I de￿ne the
output-gap in the domestic sector yd
t as
yd






t denotes the log deviation of the natural output in the domestic sector
from its steady state value, and I assume that in both sectors the log-deviation of the








t+1; 0 ￿ ￿h;n
y < 1; h = d;i;
where ￿
h;n
t+1 is a serially uncorrelated zero-mean shock to the natural output level. Fi-
nally, in line with the central banks￿view of the approximate one-period lag necessary
to a⁄ect aggregate demand, I assume that consumption decisions are predetermined
one period in advance and obtain the aggregate demand in the domestic sector in
terms of the output-gap
yd
t+1 = ￿yyd








t+1 is a serially uncorrelated zero-mean demand shock. In (15) all the coe¢ -
cients are positive and functions of the structural parameters of the model.
2.1.3 Consumption and aggregate demand of goods produced in the im-
port sector
Considering equation (2), the (log-deviation of) consumption of goods produced in
the import sector, ci
t; is given by
ci






= ct ￿ ￿(1 ￿ w)qt; (16)
and following the same derivation used for the AD in the domestic sector yields
ci
t = ￿￿ (1 ￿ F1L)
￿1 ￿t ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ F1L)
￿1 wqt ￿ ￿(1 ￿ w)qt: (17)








t denotes the amount of the import good used as an input in the domestic













Log-linearizing (18) around the steady state results in
b yi
t = (1 ￿ e ￿)ci
t + e ￿b yd
t : (19)
















where all the coe¢ cients are positive and depend on the structural parameters of the
model and ￿i
t+1 is a serially uncorrelated zero-mean demand shock.
Summing up, aggregate demands in both sectors in period t + 1 are based on
the information available in period t; because of the assumption of predetermined
expenditure decisions. Due to the use of the output produced in the other sec-
tor as an input, they depend also on the demand in the other sector. Due to the
assumptions of habit formation in consumption, they depend on the previous aggre-





￿=0 ; the central bank a⁄ects the long interest rate de￿ned
in equation (8) which, in turn, a⁄ects the output gap. This is the aggregate de-
mand channel. Finally, a ￿rst exchange rate channel, which consists of switching the
demand between domestic and foreign goods, is captured here by the terms of trade.
2.2 Firms
In both sectors, aggregate supply is derived according to the Calvo (1983) staggered
price model and in￿ ation inertia is introduced as indicated by Christiano et al. (2001)
and also by the presence of the terms of trade. Beyond the use of di⁄erent inputs,
the two sectors have di⁄erent ￿rm decision timing.
2.2.1 Domestic sector
In the domestic sector, the representative consumer/producer j produces the variety
j of the domestic good, Y d
t (j); with a composite input whose price is Wt. Since all
the varieties use the same technology, there is a unique input requirement function







and the variable cost of producing the quantity
Y d








: Furthermore, since there is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of
domestic goods, the demand for variety j is
Y d









13As it has been noted by Benigno (2004), the presence of the terms of trade introduces furter
inertia. Indeed, from the de￿nition of the terms of trade it follows that




t+￿jt; 8￿ ￿ 0:
10where Pd
t (j) is the nominal price for variety j and # is the elasticity of substitution
between di⁄erent varieties. As shown in equation (10), the composite input is a
convex combination of both aggregates of domestic and import goods (with price
Pi
t and which will be described below). Thus the price of the input is given by
Wt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Pd
t + ￿Pi
t:
Then, I assume (i) that the consumer/producer chooses in any period the new
price with probability (1 ￿ ￿) or keeps the previous period price indexed to past
in￿ ation with probability ￿; and (ii) that the price at period t+g is chosen g periods
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t+g and ￿ denote, respectively, the marginal utility of domestic goods,
the new price chosen in period t for period t + g and the degree of indexation to the
previous period in￿ ation rate14. Following Svensson (2000), I set ￿ = 1 to ensure the
natural-rate hypothesis. Finally, assuming that the purchasing power parity holds in
the long run, the log-linearized version of the Phillips curve for the domestic sector


















where ! is the output elasticity of the marginal input requirement function and "t+2
is a zero-mean i.i.d. cost-push shock.
In line with the central banks￿experience of an approximate two-period lag re-
quired to a⁄ect domestic in￿ ation, I derive (21) assuming that pricing decisions are
predetermined two periods in advance, i.e. g = 2: Equation (21) is equal to the
Svensson (2000) aggregate supply, except (i) for the inertia in the in￿ ation dynamics,
which is here also based on the indexation to past in￿ ation and (ii) for the charac-
terization of import goods, which in this model are generally di⁄erent from foreign
14Recalling that consumption decisions are predetermined one period in advance, the marginal
utility of domestic goods e ￿
d




















where ￿t is the marginal utility of nominal income in period t:
11goods15.
According to (21), in￿ ation is a predetermined variable based, on the one hand,
on expectations of future in￿ ation, demand and input price relying on the information
set available two periods ago. On the other hand, it is based on previous value of
in￿ ation. It is worth noting that the relevance of the assumptions of (i) predetermined
pricing decision and (ii) indexation to the previous period in￿ ation is in improving
the empirical ￿t. Indeed, as shown by Woodford (2003), these assumptions eliminate
two counterfactual predictions of the basic Calvo model, i.e. the immediate and sharp
reaction of in￿ ation to monetary policy shocks.
Equation (21) shows that beyond the aggregate demand and the in￿ ation expec-
tations channels, monetary policy a⁄ects domestic in￿ ation via the impact of the
nominal exchange rate on the real price of the input, which turns out to be equal to
￿qt
16: This is the second of the three exchange rate channels embedded in this model.
The strength of this channel depends on nominal rigidities, imperfect competition and
the (degree of) convexity of the input required function captured, respectively, by ￿,
# and !: Also, it depends on the relevance of the import goods in the production of
the domestic goods, which is captured by ￿, and, indirectly, on the characteristics of
the pass-through17.
2.2.2 Import sector
Similarly to the domestic sector, variety j of the import goods, Y i
t (j), is produced
by the representative consumer/producer j with a composite input whose price is Ft.







; the variable cost of producing
the quantity Y i








. Furthermore, since there is a Dixit-Stiglitz
aggregate of import goods with elasticity of substitution # > 1; the demand for
variety j is
Y i










t (j) is the nominal price for variety j; and Pi
t is the Dixit-Stiglitz price index
for import goods. Finally, considering that the input is a convex combination of the
aggregate of domestic goods and of the foreign good, with price P￿
t St; where P￿
t is the






Now relaxing the assumption that pricing decisions are predetermined g periods
15Here import and foreign goods coincide in the special case of complete pass-through, which is
described below.




around the steady state yields
￿qt:
17As it will be shown below, the terms of trade qt depend on the price level in the import sector,
which in turn depends on the pass-through.
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t; ￿i have the same meaning of their analogous variables in the domestic
sector. Here, the assumption of g = 0 is motivated by the fact that the import sector
acts as a retailer sector for the foreign goods and, in practice, retailers do not set
their price before they take e⁄ect as much as producers do.
Then, assuming ￿ = 1 and that the purchasing power parity holds in the long




















t denotes (the log deviation of) the price of the composite input in the import
sector expressed in terms of the import goods price, pi










t is the (log) foreign price level. It is worth noting that the introduction of
the variable qi
t is a convenient way to obtain an aggregate supply relation in terms of
stationary variables.
Equation (22) is derived in a similar way to (21). Here, however, pricing decisions
are no longer assumed to be predetermined. As a result, ￿i
t is a forward looking
variable and we have a direct in￿ ation expectation channel working via ￿i
t+1jt and a
third exchange rate channel working via qi; the DERC18. To describe incomplete pass-
through, it is worth recalling that production in the import sector uses foreign goods
and the goods produced in the domestic sector. The need of distribution services
motivates the presence of the goods produced in the domestic sector. Speci￿cally, it
is assumed that to bring one unit of the foreign good to domestic consumers requires
some units of a basket of di⁄erentiated domestic goods. Consequently, by introducing
a wedge between the price of the foreign goods paid by the domestic consumers and by
18It is interesting to note that part of the direct expectation channel adds to the DERC. Indeed,




















which shows that the DERC works not only via q
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13the retailers, this assumption models the degree of completeness of the pass-through.
In particular, it establishes an inverse relation between the completeness of the pass-
through and the need of distribution services captured by the coe¢ cient ￿i:
A notable feature of this Phillips curve is that the stickiness in the price adjust-
ment determines the speed of the pass-through. When ￿i = 0; all the ￿rms in the
import sector set in any period their price equal to a mark-up over the marginal cost.
Thus a shock to the exchange rate or the foreign price feeds immediately to the price
of the import goods. In addition, if we assume also no local inputs, (￿i = 0); we
obtain the benchmark case of perfect (i.e. complete and immediate) pass-through
where the DERC reaches its greatest e¢ ciency.
2.2.3 CPI in￿ ation
Considering the log-linearized version of the CPI price equation (3), CPI-in￿ ation,
￿c
t; is given by
￿c




t is predetermined, at time t monetary policy can a⁄ect ￿c
t only with ￿i
t:
Speci￿cally, since yi
t is predetermined as well, monetary policy a⁄ects ￿c
t by steering
the nominal exchange rate which is a forward looking variable given the uncovered
interest parity (always ful￿lled) and the purchasing power parity (ful￿lled only in the
long run). Then, monetary policy a⁄ects ￿i
t according to the Phillips curve (22) via
the impact of the exchange rate on the real price of the input in the import sector
illustrated by equation (23) and via ￿i
t+1jt: This indicates the role of the DERC and
expectations in allowing monetary policy to have an impact on CPI in￿ ation in the
short run.
2.3 Uncovered interest parity in terms of qi; transmission channels
and lags
In order to eliminate the non-stationary nominal exchange rate, it is convenient to





















where rt is the short term real interest rate de￿ned as rt ￿ it ￿ ￿d
t+1jt:
Summing up, almost all channels need some time to convey the monetary policy to
in￿ ation. With the aggregate demand channel there is a (one-period) lag to transmit
the stimulus to CPI in￿ ation via the output-gap in the import sector, and a (two-
period) lag to a⁄ect domestic in￿ ation via the expected output-gap in the domestic
sector19. With both the in￿ ation expectations channel and with the channel that
transmits the impact of the exchange rate to the price of the input in the domestic
sector, i.e. ￿qt+2jt in equation (21), there is a (two-period) lag to a⁄ect domestic
in￿ ation due to predetermined price setting behavior. The only channels for which
there is no lag are the direct in￿ ation expectation channel and the DERC. For the
latter, the real interest parity condition (25) conveys the monetary impulse to the
real price of the composite input in the import sector, qi
t, which, in turn, directly hits
import sector in￿ ation.
19It is a common assumption in the literature that the aggregate demand channel a⁄ects in￿ ation
with a two-period lag.
142.4 The public sector













where ￿d; ￿i; ￿ and ￿ are weights that express the preferences of the central bank
for the CPI and domestic in￿ ation targets, the output stabilization target and the
instrument smoothing target respectively.
2.5 The rest of the world
I assume stationary univariate AR(1) processes for the exogenous variables foreign











where the coe¢ cients are non-negative and less than unity and the shocks are white









where the coe¢ cients are positive and ￿￿
it is a white noise.
2.6 Calibration
The choice of the structural parameters mostly follows Svensson (2000). See the
Appendix for the full set of parameters.
3 Optimal monetary policy
To recap, the model consists of the maximization of the central bank, ￿rms and
households preferences and their optimal behaviors are described by structural rela-
tions, namely the reaction function for the central bank, the aggregate supplies for
the ￿rms and the aggregate demands for the households.
In this general equilibrium model, the (column) vectors of predetermined20, forward-














































t ; 0; 0; 0
￿0
:
20It is worthwhile pointing out that ￿
d
t+1jt is a predetermined variable. This is apparent if we
consider the domestic sector Phillips curve and take the expectation at time t+1 because "t+2jt+1 = 0
and ￿
d
t+2jt+1 is a function of predetermined variables.










such that, for any given vector of the shocks and set of plans for the exogenous
variables, (i) the central bank maximizes its preferences, (ii) the households maximize
their utilities and (iii) the ￿rms maximize their pro￿ts. Since each agent takes the
(optimal) behavior of the other agents as given in his decision process, these plans
are also a Nash equilibrium.





given the lags in transmission channels, determines expectations of future in￿ ation
and output with the smallest variability and in line with their targets at a certain
time horizon. Thus, the more forward looking the private sector behavior, the more
monetary policy consists of the management of the expectations.
Concerning the optimal monetary policy, the model presents a time-invariant
reaction function which is the ￿rst order condition obtained by the intertemporal
optimization of the central bank preferences. This function is linear in the vector of
the predetermined variables and since the model is linear-quadratic and uncertainty
enters additively, certainty equivalence holds and it does not depend on the covariance
matrix of the shocks. To ￿nd this reaction function I used the dynamic programming
technique of the linear stochastic regulator with rational expectations and forward-
looking variables21.
3.1 Domestic and CPI in￿ ation-targeting
Table 1 and 2 report the coe¢ cients of the reaction functions for the cases of strict
and ￿ exible domestic and CPI in￿ ation-targeting under various assumptions on the
types and degree of pass-through22.













t it￿1 qt￿1 qi
t￿1
Perf.; ￿i=0; ￿i=0:05 0.00 1.49 0.00 0.08 0.08 -0.00 0.07 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02 0.52 0.00 0.00
Inc.; ￿i=0:5; ￿i=0:05 0.00 1.54 0.00 0.03 0.09 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.08 -0.01 0.51 0.00 0.00
Del.; ￿i=0; ￿i=0:5 -0.01 1.49 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.01 -0.08 0.00 0.48 0.01 0.00













t it￿1 qt￿1 qi
t￿1
Perf.; ￿i=0; ￿i=0:05 0.03 0.74 0.00 0.28 0.68 0.02 0.18 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 0.37 -0.03 0.00
Inc.; ￿i=0:5; ￿i=0:05 0.02 0.76 0.00 0.08 0.71 -0.01 0.07 -0.03 -0.09 -0.03 0.38 -0.02 0.00
Del.; ￿i=0; ￿i=0:5 -0.02 0.74 0.06 0.10 0.70 0.03 0.12 0.02 -0.11 -0.00 0.36 0.02 0.00
Del., Inc.; ￿i=0:5; ￿i=0:5 0.01 0.75 0.03 0.06 0.71 0.02 0.07 0.00 -0.11 -0.01 0.37 -0.01 0.00
21In particular, since this optimization problem does not have a closed form solution, I used the
Oudiz and Sachs (1985) algorithm, which is further discussed in Backus Dri¢ l (1986), Curie and
Levine (1993) and Soderlind (1999). The optimization problem is reported in Appendix B.
22For strict and ￿ exible domestic in￿ation-targeting, the weights in the loss function are ￿
c =
0; ￿
d = 1; ￿ = 0; ￿ = 0:01; and ￿
c = 0; ￿
d = 1; ￿ = 0:5; ￿ = 0:01; respectively: For strict and
￿ exible CPI in￿ation-targeting, the weights are ￿
c = 1; ￿
d = 0; ￿ = 0; ￿ = 0:01; and ￿
c = 1; ￿
d =
0; ￿ = 0:5; ￿ = 0:01; respectively: The choice of the interest smoothing parameter ￿ balances two
contrasting goals: To avoid a completely unrealistic monetary policy, which may occur when values of
￿ are too small and, on the other hand, to avoid an ine¢ cient monetary policy as to the stabilization
of CPI in￿ ation, which instead occurs when ￿ is not su¢ ciently small.
16First of all, Table 1 shows that the optimal monetary policy is very simple: only
the coe¢ cients for expected domestic in￿ ation ￿d
t+1jt, the lagged interest rate it￿1 and,
in the ￿ exible case, the output-gap in the domestic sector yd
t and foreign variables ￿￿
t
and y￿
t are sizeable, with the coe¢ cient for it￿1 di⁄erent from zero because of interest
rate smoothing.
Second, domestic in￿ ation-targeting policies, in particular strict in￿ ation-targeting,
do not depend signi￿cantly on the pass-through. Indeed, changes in the type and
degree of pass-through have a negligible impact on the coe¢ cients.













t it￿1 qt￿1 qi
t￿1
Per.; ￿i=0; ￿i=0:05 0.46 -3.27 0.07 -0.01 0.00 0.55 0.54 0.97 -0.01 0.22 0.00 0.02 0.00
Inc.; ￿i=0:5; ￿i=0:05 2.20 -4.24 0.11 0.47 -0.01 1.01 0.76 0.77 0.05 0.26 0.07 -0.43 0.00
Del..; ￿i=0; ￿i=0:5 2.65 0.25 0.40 0.44 -0.02 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.43 -0.26 0.00













t it￿1 qt￿1 qi
t￿1
Per.; ￿i=0; ￿i=0:05 1.09 -1.62 0.06 0.33 0.08 0.53 0.67 0.89 0.22 0.15 0.03 -0.18 0.00
Inc.; ￿i=0:5; ￿i=0:05 2.02 -2.49 0.09 0.47 0.30 0.79 0.66 0.62 0.11 0.15 0.12 -0.42 0.00
Del..; ￿i=0; ￿i=0:5 1.36 -0.93 0.27 0.11 0.62 0.08 0.17 0.10 -0.10 0.02 0.33 0.02 0.00
Del., Inc.; ￿i=0:5; ￿i=0:5 0.88 -0.28 0.16 0.08 0.69 0.05 0.10 0.03 -0.10 -0.00 0.36 -0.03 0.00
Third, in contrast with the domestic in￿ ation-targeting case, Table 2 shows that
with CPI in￿ ation-targeting the reaction function is sophisticated. This could be a
disadvantage in that it could lead, in practice, to implementation problems. Further-
more, with CPI in￿ ation-targeting, the pass-through a⁄ects the optimal monetary
policy. Here, changes in sign and size of the coe¢ cients stand out and show that
with respect to the benchmark case of perfect pass-through, incomplete and delayed
pass-through tend to have opposite e⁄ects on the monetary policy. In particular,
incomplete pass-through leads to a more aggressive monetary policy while delayed
pass-through leads to a less aggressive one. This result will also show up below in the
Impulse Response Functions (IRFs). The intuition is that delayed pass-through re-
duces the e¢ ciency of the DERC much more than incomplete pass-through23. Thus,
the stabilization of CPI in￿ ation requires a monetary policy which is more aggressive
with delayed pass-through than with incomplete pass-through. Yet, a too aggressive
monetary policy is not feasible because it generates more volatility in the interest rate
and in the output-gap which increase the loss of the central bank24. As a result, with
delayed pass-through, the optimal transmission mechanism uses the DERC channel
less and monetary policy tends to give up the stabilization of ￿c
t.
23This is apparent in (22) and (23) which show that delayed and incomplete pass-through a⁄ect
￿
i
t in a non linear and linear way respectively.
24Further results available on request show that reducing the concern of the central bank on the
interest rate smoothing and the stabilization of the output gap (in the ￿ exible case) determines
a monetary policy that with delayed pass-through is more aggressive than with incomplete pass-
through.
173.2 Impulse responses
In Figures (3-10) the impulse responses for domestic and CPI in￿ ation-targeting
under di⁄erent assumptions on the pass-through are reported. They are generated
assuming that the economy is in steady state and then is hit by a certain shock whose
value is set equal to 1.
In each ￿gure, the ￿rst, second, third and fourth column refer, respectively, to
the cases of perfect, incomplete, delayed and both incomplete and delayed pass-
through. The shocks considered are a cost-push shock (Figures 3-6) and a foreign
in￿ ation shock (Figures 7-10). For sake of simplicity but without loss of generality,
the description of the impulse response functions skips the intermediate step from the
change of the instrument to the nominal exchange rate. In this way I focus directly
on the impact of the monetary policy on the variable qi
t; which is central in the use
of the DERC. Yet, for sake of completeness I report the behavior of the nominal
exchange rate which can always be explained by purchasing power parity (satis￿ed
in the long run) and the uncovered interest parity provided by equation (5).
3.2.1 Strict domestic in￿ ation-targeting, IRF to a cost-push shock
In Figure 3, optimal monetary policy works mainly via the aggregate demand channel
and the two exchange rate channels other than the DERC.
Monetary policy consists of an initial increase of the nominal interest rate which
is gradually taken back to zero (sixth row). Then, the real interest rate rises (seventh
row) provoking a fall of the output-gap in the domestic sector (fourth row); this is
the aggregate demand channel.
In order to contribute to the stabilization of ￿d, the terms of trade, q, decreases.
As a result, some demand switches from domestic to import goods (￿rst exchange
rate channel that adds to the aggregate demand channel) while the real price of the
input in the domestic sector falls (second exchange rate channel that works via the
production costs in the domestic sector).
Since in the import sector the switching demand e⁄ect tends to outstrip the e⁄ect
of the increase in the real interest rate, yi slightly rises initially (￿fth row). Now, a
decrease in q occurs if and only if ￿d is larger than ￿i. Thus, to curb the increase of
in￿ ation in the import sector caused by yi, qi has to decrease.
With incomplete pass-through (second column), the cost-push shock propagates
to qi via equation (23) and the monetary policy lets that qi increase via the interest
parity in terms of qi: Consequently, to avoid that ￿i increase too much, yi has to
fall (￿fth row). This happens because now the aggregate demand e⁄ect outstrips the
switching demand e⁄ect, and this is consistent with a path of q which is less negative
than before.
With delayed pass-through (third column), a change in qi and yi have a smaller
impact on ￿i. Now only half of the ￿rms in the import sector can update the price
optimally so that the elasticity of in￿ ation to the real price of the input and to the
output-gap in the import sector is much smaller25. Thus, monetary policy provokes
a smaller increase in the import sector in￿ ation, which in turn determines a larger
decrease of the terms of trade. As a result, there are a stronger switching demand
e⁄ect and fall in the price of the domestic sector input, which explain why monetary
25Note that in the case of immediate pass-through this elasticity tends to in￿nity so that an




t is su¢ cient to increase ￿
i
t:
18policy can be slightly more moderate. It is worth noting here that delayed pass-
through, by reducing the e¢ ciency of the DERC, tends to improve the e¢ ciency
of the overall transmission mechanism, in particular of the other two exchange rate
channels. Indeed, allowing this channel to absorb some of the monetary policy shock
results in a smaller increase in the import sector in￿ ation, which leads to a larger
decrease of the terms of trade.
3.2.2 Flexible domestic in￿ ation-targeting, IRF to cost-push shock
In the ￿ exible domestic in￿ ation-targeting cases (Figure 4), monetary policy is similar
to, but more moderate than, the strict cases. Here the output-gap in the domestic
sector is almost completely stabilized at the cost of a slightly longer period to stabilize
domestic in￿ ation.
3.2.3 Strict CPI in￿ ation-targeting, IRF to cost-push shock
In Figure 5, with perfect pass-through (￿rst column), optimal monetary policy man-
ages to stabilize CPI in￿ ation (￿rst row) after a cost push shock. In the ￿rst two
periods this shock can be absorbed only via the DERC and the direct expectation
channel because domestic in￿ ation is predetermined. As a result, to let in￿ ation in
the import sector o⁄set the shock, monetary policy cuts the interest rate in t, in-
creases it sharply in t + 1 and takes it to zero in the subsequent periods. Such a
policy allows qi to be su¢ ciently negative in the initial periods so that it outweights
the positive impact of yi on the path of ￿i: As to the rest of the economy, the sizable
decrease of the terms of trade (ninth row) determines a strong switching demand
e⁄ect portrayed respectively by the fall and rise of the output-gap in the domestic
and import sector (fourth and ￿fth row).
When the pass-through is incomplete (second column), the ability to fully stabilize
CPI in￿ ation tends to decrease. Now the price of the input in the import sector
depends also on local factors and, consequently, the DERC is less e¢ cient. Thus,
a more aggressive monetary policy is required which, however, is bounded by the
interest smoothing constraint.
When the pass-through is delayed (third column) only half of the ￿rms in the
import sector is allowed to update optimally the current price of the import. This
results in a more relevant reduction of the DERC e¢ ciency because now optimal
monetary policy can reduce the current cost of production only for half of the ￿rms.
Thus, an even more aggressive and volatile monetary policy is required to stabilize
CPI, which is not feasible due to the interest smoothing constraint. As a result, CPI
in￿ ation stabilization is reduced even more.
Finally, when the pass-through is incomplete and delayed (fourth row), these two
sources of ine¢ ciency of the DERC add up resulting in a largest variability of CPI
in￿ ation.
3.2.4 Flexible CPI in￿ ation-targeting, IRF to cost-push shock
With ￿ exible CPI in￿ ation-targeting, Figure 6, an intense use of the DERC to stabilize
CPI in￿ ation is no longer feasible due to the deep and long fall that it would generate
in the output-gap. Yet, comparing this case with the ￿ exible domestic in￿ ation-
targeting case reported in Figure 4, shows that in the initial periods, in the former
case, in￿ ation in the import sector is kept low in order to stabilize CPI in￿ ation.
19Thus, the DERC is still actively used in ￿ exible CPI in￿ ation-targeting, and the
third row in Figure 6 reveals that its role in the transmission mechanism tends to
decrease moving from perfect to the imperfect pass-through cases.
3.2.5 Strict domestic in￿ ation-targeting, foreign in￿ ation shock
It is noteworthy that in this model shocks in foreign in￿ ation or income tend to have
a similar qualitative impact on the domestic economy. This is due to the fact that
to a large extent they share the same transmission mechanism because the foreign
economy is assumed to set the monetary policy according to the Taylor rule. Indeed,
a change in either foreign in￿ ation or income has the same qualitative impact on
the foreign interest rate, which in turn a⁄ects the domestic interest rate through the
uncovered parity condition. In addition, foreign in￿ ation and income have a similar
impact on the demand of home goods via the aggregate demand channel.
For example, let us consider a foreign in￿ ation shock. Now domestic in￿ ation is
una⁄ected in the ￿rst two periods and from the third period on it depends on the
sequence of expectations of the output-gap and of the terms of trade taken in t26. The
shock increases the price of the input in the import sector. When the pass-through is
perfect (Figure 7, ￿rst column), all the ￿rms in the import sector respond optimally
to the shock in period t: Since demand is predetermined, the ￿rms in the import
sector can o⁄set the shock completely by raising their price in period t (third row).
This determines an increase of the terms of trade (eight row), which on the one hand
switches the demand from the import to the domestic sector and, on the other hand,
tends to increase the production costs in the domestic sector. Therefore, to avoid
an upward pressure on domestic in￿ ation, the optimal monetary policy increases the
nominal interest rate causing a slight fall of the output-gap in the domestic sector
(fourth row).
When the pass-through is incomplete (second column), both foreign goods and
local inputs are used in the import sector. Thus the impact of the foreign in￿ ation
shock on the production cost in the import sector decreases. As a result the opti-
mal monetary policy and the response of the economy exhibit only a quantitative
di⁄erence with the perfect pass-through case.
With delayed pass-through (third column), only half of the ￿rms in the import
sector can react optimally to the shock. This explains why in￿ ation in the import
sector and the terms of trade rise less (third and ninth row) and the real cost of
production in the import sector rises more (eight row).
It is interesting to note that the type and degree of pass-through do not a⁄ect the
ability of the central bank in stabilizing domestic in￿ ation. However, imperfect pass-
through tends to shield the economy from the shock in that it reduces the e¢ ciency of
the DERC in propagating the shock. This is more apparent in the case of delayed and
incomplete pass-through, (fourth column), which is characterized by less variability
of ￿i; ￿c and q.
3.2.6 Flexible domestic in￿ ation-targeting, foreign in￿ ation shock
In Figure 8, with ￿ exible domestic in￿ ation-targeting, the objective of output-gap
stabilization slightly constrains the stabilization of ￿d. Furthermore, the monetary
26This can be shown by taking the expectation in t of the domestic sector AS and solving it
forward.
20policy and the response of the economy di⁄er only quantitatively and to a minor
extent with the ones with strict domestic in￿ ation-targeting.
3.2.7 Strict CPI in￿ ation-targeting, foreign in￿ ation shock
In Figure 9, for the various cases of pass-through, the monetary policy and the
response of the economy are similar: the shock exerts a pressure on in￿ ation in the
import sector and consequently on CPI in￿ ation. The response of the monetary policy
consists of a hike of the instrument it (sixth row) which is then gradually taken back
to zero. This policy lets the DERC initially absorb the shock. Then, the aggregate
demand channel is available (because the output-gap is no longer predetermined) and
it carries out the stabilization of ￿i in the subsequent periods by a fall in the output-
gap in the import sector (￿fth row). This restrictive monetary policy also determines
a fall in the output-gap in the domestic sector (forth row) and it is via the positive
path of q (ninth row) that de￿ ation in the domestic sector does not occur.
A common feature with the case of strict domestic in￿ ation-targeting is that the
type and degree of pass-through does not a⁄ect the ability of the central bank in
stabilizing in￿ ation. A di⁄erence is that moving from perfect to imperfect pass-
through does not reduce the variability of ￿c; ￿i and q.
3.2.8 Flexible CPI in￿ ation-targeting, foreign in￿ ation shock
As expected, now less variability in the output-gap is achieved at the cost of more
variability in CPI in￿ ation. The various cases reported in Figure 10 di⁄er with the
case of strict CPI in￿ ation-targeting (Figure 9) for a minor use of both the DERC
and the aggregate demand channel. These changes are re￿ ected for the DERC in a
larger in￿ ation in the import sector (third row) and, for the demand channel, in a
minor decline of the output-gap (fourth row). This result is obtained with a slightly
di⁄erent interest rate plan that results in a less tight monetary policy.
4 Imperfect pass-through and volatility in economic ac-
tivity
This section focuses on the relation between the pass-through and the volatility in
economic activity and analyzes how the central bank could use this relation to improve
its stabilization task.
4.1 Taylor curves
Figure 1 and 2 below illustrate, respectively, the Taylor curves for various degrees of





















Figure 1. CPI in￿ ation-targeting with incomplete and immediate PT,
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Figure 2. CPI in￿ ation-targeting with delayed and complete PT,
￿i 2 f0:05; 0:4; 0:6g; ￿i = 0:
These Taylor curves show that the trade-o⁄between the variability of the output-
gap and CPI in￿ ation worsens when the pass-through is more incomplete and/or
delayed. It is noteworthy that the impact of the pass-through tends to be stronger,
the more the central bank cares about CPI-in￿ ation stabilization (strict in￿ ation-
targeting, SIT) versus output-gap stabilization (￿ exible in￿ ation-targeting, FIT).
This is due to the lower e¢ ciency of the DERC, which is important to stabilize
CPI in￿ ation in the short run.
The relation between the pass-through and the Taylor curves is even more in-
teresting if one considers the relation between the in￿ ation environment and the
pass-through. With respect to the latter, there is a growing view in the literature
for that moving to a lower in￿ ation environment decreases the pass-through. This
idea is consistent with the observation that a lower pass-through coupled with a more
credible commitment to stabilize in￿ ation has occurred in the last ten years. The-
oretically, Taylor (2000) provided the ￿rst motivation for this relation showing how
moving to a lower in￿ ation environment reduces the pass-through by decreasing the
expected persistence of cost changes. This relation is also supported empirically, for
example, in Bailliu and Fujii (2004)27. Thus, if we assume following Taylor (2000)
27For other explanations and empirical evidence concerning the relation between the in￿ ation
environment and the pass-through see also Coudhry and Hakura (2001), Devereux and Yetman
(2002) and Deverux, Engel, and Storgaard (2003).
22that a stable and lower in￿ ation reduces the pass-through, to achieve a lower vari-
ability of CPI in￿ ation could turn out to be more costly than expected in terms of
output-gap variability. A case in point might be a central bank that decides to switch
to in￿ ation-targeting. Indeed, consider Figure 2 and suppose that due to a high initial
in￿ ation the pass-through tends to be immediate, for instance consider the Taylor
curve with ￿i = 0:05. Then suppose that the in￿ ation variability is around 1 std and
that, on the basis of this Taylor curve, the new in￿ ation target monetary policy aims
to achieve a variability of 0.4 std accepting a resulting output-gap variability of 3.2
std. Yet, the more CPI in￿ ation variability falls, the worse is the trade-o⁄ so that
it turns out to be impossible to attain the pair (0.4, 3.2). In fact, the pass-through
is more delayed (say ￿i = 0:6) and the 0.4 CPI std target requires 4.1 std in the
output-gap.
In summary, this analysis leads to two results. The ￿rst is that it is important to
know the type and degree of the pass-through to assess the attainable output-gap-CPI
in￿ ation variabilities trade-o⁄s. The second is that, combining this ￿nding with the
literature on the relation between the pass-through and the in￿ ation environment, a
chosen variability of CPI in￿ ation could be achieved at a output-gap variability cost
much higher than expected.
These results suggest an extension for further research in introducing endoge-
nously the impact of the monetary policy on the pass-through. This could be done
for instance via a Phillips curve that allows the degree of price stickiness to be de-
termined endogenously as in Bakhshi et al. (2004).
234.2 Unconditional standard deviations, imperfect exchange rate pass-
through and choice of the in￿ ation target
The following tables report the unconditional standard deviations for the main macrovari-
ables in the model.




t qt it rt
1. Strict domestic in￿ ation-targeting
1.a Perfect PT 1.27 1.22 1.52 4.11 1.41 0.88
1.b.Incomplete PT 1.17 1.22 1.50 2.62 1.47 0.92
1.c Delayed PT 1.01 1.22 1.52 2.68 1.35 0.82
1.d Incom. and del. PT 1.04 1.22 1.49 2.08 1.43 0.89
2. Flexible domestic in￿ ation-targeting
2.a Perfect PT 1.56 1.30 1.26 4.09 1.32 1.11
2.b Incomplete PT 1.38 1.29 1.26 2.61 1.35 1.15
2.c Delayed PT 1.21 1.29 1.27 2.42 1.30 1.13
2.d Incom. and del. PT 1.20 1.29 1.26 1.83 1.33 1.14
3. Strict CPI in￿ ation-targeting
3.a Perfect PT 0.03 1.51 4.17 7.80 3.59 4.60
3.b Incomplete PT 0.17 1.51 4.70 7.22 5.08 5.98
3.c Delayed PT 0.46 1.36 3.04 5.61 4.37 4.35
3.d Incom. and del. PT 0.69 1.30 3.32 3.91 4.31 4.20
4. Flexible CPI in￿ ation-targeting
4.a Perfect PT 0.94 1.23 1.72 3.13 2.02 2.10
4.b Incomplete PT 1.05 1.22 1.59 2.36 2.06 1.99
4.c Delayed PT 1.03 1.24 1.45 2.78 1.49 1.18
4.d Incom. and del. PT 1.09 1.24 1.34 2.04 1.48 1.19
First, Table 3 shows that the impact of the pass-through on the volatility of the
economy is smaller with domestic than with CPI in￿ ation-targeting. Indeed, with
domestic in￿ ation-targeting only the variability of ￿c and q decreases signi￿cantly
when the pass-through is incomplete and/or delayed. In particular, the variability
of yd is not a⁄ected. In contrast, with CPI in￿ ation-targeting, the pass-through
also a⁄ects the variability of the other variables. Furthermore, with CPI in￿ ation-
targeting the variability in economic activity tends to rise. Yet, the concern for
interest rate smoothing and the output-gap stabilization prevents it from increasing
too much28.
Second, imperfect pass-through tends to have opposite e⁄ects on the volatility of
￿c with the two in￿ ation targets. Speci￿cally, it decreases the volatility with domestic
in￿ ation-targeting while increases it with CPI in￿ ation-targeting. Furthermore, with
any in￿ ation targets, imperfect pass-through reduces the variability of q. These
results depend on two factors. The ￿rst is that imperfect pass-through reduces the
e¢ ciency of the DERC. Since CPI in￿ ation stabilization relies signi￿cantly on this
channel, less e¢ ciency of the DERC requires a more aggressive monetary policy that,
in turn, leads to an excessive variability of the other macro variables, in particular
28This explains why, with strict CPI, moving from the benchmark case to the incomplete pass-
through case, the variability of ￿
c; y and i increase. Yet, moving from the benchmark case to delayed
pass-through, the variability of i rises less, of ￿
c rises more and the one of y falls.
24output. Thus, with imperfect pass-through and realistic monetary policy the central
bank has to give up to some extent the stabilization of CPI in￿ ation. This leads to
less variability in import good in￿ ation which, in turn, leads to less variability of the
real exchange rate. The second factor is that a less e¢ cient DERC tends to absorb
foreign shocks that hit foreign in￿ ation. Consequently, the variability of in￿ ation in
the import good is less resulting in less variability also of the terms of trade and CPI
in￿ ation.
Finally, focusing on the realistic case of ￿ exible in￿ ation-targeting and comparing
domestic with CPI in￿ ation-targeting, the latter case leads to a smaller variability of
the in￿ ation target but at the cost of introducing in the economy a larger variability
in domestic output. Thus the choice of the target depends on to what extent the
central bank accepts output volatility. A central bank that switches to in￿ ation-
targeting and has yet to acquire a solid reputation, may initially ￿nd it useful to use
CPI in￿ ation as the target. Indeed, it allows a better control of in￿ ation in the short
run and ensures less overall volatility of this variable. These are both important
to build its reputation, a crucial ingredient to e¢ ciently shape expectations. Yet,
for a central bank that has already established its credibility, it seems better to
choose domestic in￿ ation as the target. Indeed, this target generates signi￿cantly
less volatility in the output. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the advantage
of the CPI target fades away the more the pass-through is incomplete and delayed.
Indeed, the gap between the variability of ￿d and ￿c in the two cases shrinks. Also,
CPI in￿ ation-targeting leads in general to a larger variability in the interest rate
and, with delayed pass-through, it also generates a larger volatility of the terms of
trade29. Finally, as shown in Table 2, CPI in￿ ation-targeting necessitates a more
sophisticated monetary policy than domestic in￿ ation-targeting, leaving room for
potential errors in its implementation. Consequently, this analysis supports domestic
in￿ ation-targeting with imperfect pass-through and shows the costs and bene￿ts of
CPI in￿ ation-targeting with perfect pass-through. This ￿nding is consistent with
the previous analysis and relies on the e¢ ciency of the DERC and its role in the
transmission mechanism. Thus, depending on the relevance in practice of imperfect
pass-through, this model adds a new dimension to question the general practice of
in￿ ation-targeting central banks that choose CPI in￿ ation as the in￿ ation measure
to target.
5 Conclusions
In this paper I have analyzed the relation between the exchange rate pass-through and
the optimal monetary policy for a small open-economy pursuing in￿ ation-targeting.
Earlier papers have studied this relation, yet none of them embeds a sophisticated
transmission mechanism with stylized realistic lags, the in￿ ation forecast targeting
procedure and the analysis of both incomplete and delayed pass-through. These
features are relevant because they allow characterizing better the monetary policies
available to an in￿ ation-targeting central bank and their implications in terms of the
variability of the economy. Speci￿cally, incorporating these features into a full-blown
microfounded model, results in the following results.
29The volatility of i and q are relevant if one considers the arguments for the smoothing of the
interest rate and that (a second order approximation of) the utility function depends negatively on
the variability of the terms of trade (Benigno (2004)).
25Foremost, the model shows that the type and degree of pass-through play an
important role in the capacity of the central bank to stabilize in the short run CPI
in￿ ation but not domestic-in￿ ation. With imperfect pass-through and some realistic
interest smoothing, optimal monetary policy loses a signi￿cant part of its latitude.
In particular, delayed pass-through turns out to reduce monetary policy e⁄ectiveness
more than incomplete pass-through. These results contrast with conventional think-
ing, according to which the ability to move the exchange rate allows the central bank
to stabilize CPI in￿ ation in the short run.
Second, imperfect pass-through tends to insulate the economy from foreign shocks
and monetary policy control. This is due to the lower e¢ ciency of the DERC, which
on the one hand reduces the impact of foreign shocks on import in￿ ation. On the
other hand, considering realistic monetary policies, it reduces the stabilization role
played by the DERC in the transmission mechanism, and, consequently, the vari-
ability of import in￿ ation. Two important implications are less variability of the
real exchange rate in general, and more variability of CPI in￿ ation in the case of
CPI in￿ ation-targeting but less variability of CPI in￿ ation in the case of domestic
in￿ ation-targeting.
Third, with CPI in￿ ation-targeting, the trade-o⁄between CPI in￿ ation and output-
gap variabilities worsens with imperfect pass-through and this phenomenon is stronger
the more monetary policy concerns with CPI in￿ ation versus output-gap stabiliza-
tion. Thus, it is important to know the type and degree of the pass-through to assess
the attainable output-gap-CPI in￿ ation variabilities trade-o⁄s. Furthermore, com-
bining this ￿nding with the literature on the relationship between the pass-through
and the in￿ ation environment, a chosen variability in CPI in￿ ation could be achieved
at an output-gap variability cost much higher than expected.
Fourth, imperfect pass-through tends to reduce the volatility of the economy with
domestic in￿ ation-targeting but it worsens the trade-o⁄ between the stabilization
of CPI in￿ ation and the output-gap with CPI in￿ ation-targeting. One important
implication is that it seems better to target domestic in￿ ation with imperfect pass-
through.
Finally, interest smoothing constrains the ability of the central bank to stabilize
CPI and domestic in￿ ation in the short run.
These ￿ndings are all grounded on the fact that the pass-through a⁄ects the




Whenever it is possible, the structural parameters of the model are set as in Svensson
(2000). They are the probability of not changing the price in the next period, ￿ =
0:5; the output elasticity of the marginal input requirement function, ! = 0:8; the
elasticity of substitution between varieties of the same type of good # = 1:25; the share
of import good in the composite input to produce the domestic good, ￿ = 0:1; the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ￿ = 0:5; the elasticity of substitution between
domestic and import goods for domestic consumers, ￿ = 1 and for foreign consumers
￿￿ = 2; the share of import goods in domestic consumption, w = 0:3; the share of
domestic good in foreign consumption, w￿ = 0:15; the income elasticity of foreign real
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y = 0:8; ￿￿
y = ￿￿
￿ = 0:8; the coe¢ cients for the foreign
Taylor rule, f￿
￿ = 1:5; f￿




￿i￿ = 0:5: The new parameters introduced in the current model are
chosen in the following way: the measure of the importance of habit formation in the
utility function, e ￿; is set equal to 0.8 according to the estimate provided by Banerjee
and Batini (2003); the degree of indexation to the previous period in￿ ation rate, ￿;
is set equal to 0.66 in line with Smets and Wouters (2005).
Aggregate demand components Regarding the aggregate demand in the do-























then log-linearizing around steady state values yields
b yd
t = k1cd
t + k2b yd
t + k3c￿d
t + k4b yi
t; (30)
where k1; k2; k3 and k4 are steady state elasticities. Since
4 P
j=1
kj = 1 and k4 depends
on ￿i; it follows that also k1; k2; k3 depend on ￿i: Now, for ￿i = 0:5; I set k1 = 0:4,




; j = 1;::;4 with linear functions passing for these points and I
obtain:
k1 = 0:433 ￿ 0:066￿i;
k2 = 0:333 ￿ 0:066￿i
k4 = 0:2￿i
k3 = 1 ￿ k1 ￿ k2 ￿ k4




0:666 + 0:066￿i￿￿1 h￿
0:433 ￿ 0:066￿i￿
cd
t + 0:2￿ib yi
t +
￿

































1 ￿ 0:766 ￿ 0:068￿i￿￿
0:666 + 0:066￿i￿￿1
:
As to the aggregate demand in the import sector, I set the e ￿ = 0:1:
27A.2 State-space form of the model


































































Denoting the dimensions of Xt; xt; Yt; by n1; n2; n3 and letting n ￿ n1+n2; it follows
that K is a n3xn3 diagonal matrix with the diagonal
￿
￿c; ￿d; ￿; ￿
￿
and o⁄-diagonal
elements equal to zero; A is a nxn matrix, B and B1 are nx1 column vectors, CZ is
a n3xn3 matrix and Ci is a n3x1 column vector.







￿t+1jt = ￿t ￿ it + ￿d
t+1jt; (31)
qt+1jt = qt + ￿i
t+1jt ￿ ￿d
t+1jt: (32)
Then, take the expectation in period t of equation (21) and solve it for ￿d
t+3jt;
￿d










￿(1+!#): Next, lead equation (15) one period and take the expectation in
period t: Then apply the same procedure to (31), (32) and (22) and substitute for
￿t+2jt, qt+2jt and ￿i




t+1jt ￿ ￿￿￿t+1jt + ￿￿it+1jt ￿ (￿￿ + ￿q)￿d
t+2jt + (￿q ￿ ￿q￿1)qt + [￿q (2 + ￿) ￿ ￿q￿1]￿i
t+1jt










￿(1+!#): Finally, substitute for yd
t+2jt and qt+2jt in (33). This gives
￿d
t+3jt = [1 + ￿ + ￿! (￿￿ + ￿q) + ￿￿]￿d






t+1jt ￿ ￿ [! (￿q (2 + ￿) ￿ ￿q￿1) + ￿(1 + ￿) + ￿]￿i
t+1jt
￿ ￿!￿yyd
t+1jt + ￿!￿￿￿t+1jt ￿ ￿!￿￿it+1jt + ￿￿ (!￿q + ￿)￿i
t





























￿ye5 ￿ ￿￿An1+3 + ￿q (A12 + An1+1 ￿ A1) ￿ ￿q￿1A12 + ￿y￿e7 + ￿yne9
￿ye6 ￿ ￿i
￿An1+3 + ￿i


















e12 + A3 ￿ e1
en1+2
￿￿i (!e6 + en1+2) ￿ ￿e3 + (1 + ￿)en1+1
























where ej; j = 0;:::;n stands for a 1xn row vector that for j = 0 has all the elements
equal to zero and for j 6= 0 has element j equal to unity and all other elements equal
to zero; Aj stands for row j of the matrix A and




An1+2 ￿ ￿ [! (￿q (2 + ￿) ￿ ￿q￿1) + ￿(1 + ￿) + ￿]An1+1
￿ ￿!￿yA5 + ￿!￿￿An1+3 + ￿￿ (!￿q + ￿)en1+1
+ !￿￿i (!￿q + ￿)A6 ￿ !￿￿y￿A7 ￿ !￿￿ynA9 ￿ ￿ [! (￿q ￿ ￿q￿1) + ￿]A12:




































￿￿!￿￿ (1 + ￿y) + ￿￿i (!￿q + ￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿i￿







































































At this point, I used the algorithm developed by Oudiz and Sachs (1985) as well as by
Backus and Dri¢ l (1986) for the solution of the optimization problem in the dynamic
programming framework; a detailed description is provided by Soderlind (1998) and
(1999). For the problem raised by the presence of future controls, see the working
paper version of Svensson (2000).
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33Figure 3. Strict domestic in￿ ation-targeting. IRF to a cost-push shock. In the ￿rst,
second, third and fourth column, ￿i and ￿i are equal, respectively, to (0.05, 0),
(0.05, 0.5), (0.5, 0) and (0.5, 0.5).
34Figure 4. Flexible domestic in￿ ation-targeting. IRF to a cost-push shock. In the
￿rst, second, third and fourth column, ￿i and ￿i are equal, respectively, to (0.05, 0),
(0.05, 0.5), (0.5, 0) and (0.5, 0.5).
35Figure 5. Strict CPI in￿ ation-targeting. IRF to a cost-push shock. In the ￿rst,
second, third and fourth column, ￿i and ￿i are equal, respectively, to (0.05, 0),
(0.05, 0.5), (0.5, 0) and (0.5, 0.5).
36Figure 6. Flexible CPI in￿ ation-targeting. IRF to a cost-push shock. In the ￿rst,
second, third and fourth column, ￿i and ￿i are equal, respectively, to (0.05, 0),
(0.05, 0.5), (0.5, 0) and (0.5, 0.5).
37Figure 7. Strict domestic in￿ ation-targeting. IRF to a foreign in￿ ation shock. In
the ￿rst, second, third and fourth column, ￿i and ￿i are equal, respectively, to
(0.05, 0), (0.05, 0.5), (0.5, 0) and (0.5, 0.5).
38Figure 8. Flexible domestic in￿ ation-targeting. IRF to a foreign in￿ ation shock. In
the ￿rst, second, third and fourth column, ￿i and ￿i are equal, respectively, to
(0.05, 0), (0.05, 0.5), (0.5, 0) and (0.5, 0.5).
39Figure 9. Strict CPI in￿ ation-targeting. IRF to a foreign in￿ ation shock. In the
￿rst, second, third and fourth column, ￿i and ￿i are equal, respectively, to (0.05, 0),
(0.05, 0.5), (0.5, 0) and (0.5, 0.5).
40Figure 10. Flexible CPI in￿ ation-targeting. IRF to a foreign in￿ ation shock. In the
￿rst, second, third and fourth column, ￿i and ￿i are equal, respectively, to (0.05, 0),
(0.05, 0.5), (0.5, 0) and (0.5, 0.5).
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